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MARCUS v HARRIS
MARCUS v. HARRIS:
Oklahoma Limitations on the Exercise of the
Attorney - Client Privilege.
In Marcus v. Harris,1 the Oklahoma supreme court has
increased the limitations on the application of the attorney-
client privilege as embodied in the Oklahoma statute granting
the privilege.2
In Marcus, the petitioner sought a writ of prohibition
against the respondent trial judge to prevent the taking of
discovery depositions from two lawyers in three cases con-
solidated for trial in the Oklahoma district court. In these
cases, plaintiff, an accounting firm, was suing the defendant
for the value of services rendered by the plaintiff as a public
accountant. The defendant, in his cross petition, claimed that,
due to the plaintiff's negligence, he was forced to employ two
lawyers to represent him before the Internal Revenue Service
in regard to the negligently prepared returns. The petitioners
in Marcus sought to have this information declared privileged
under the statute.3
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma recognized the appli-
cability of the attorney-client privilege to the case at hand.
It held, however, that not all communications between attor-
neys and clients were so privileged. The court empowered the
district judge to decide, at the time of entering the deposition,
which communications are privileged and which communica-
tions are not.
In order to understand the impact of this decision on the
privilege, it is necessary to examine the privilege prior to this
case.
The attorney-client privilege is an embodiment of the
1 Marcus v. Harris, 496 P.2d 1177 (Okla. 1972).
2 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §385 (4) (1971) provides in part:
The following persons shall be incompetent to testify: ...
An attorney concerning any communications made to him
by his client in that relation, or his advice thereon, without
the client's consent.
3 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §385 (4) (1971).
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common law.4 The privilege originated in Roman law and
became a part of the common law during the reign of Eliza-
beth 1.6 The existence of this privilege has always been based
on the idea that:
In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal
advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled dis-
closure by legal advisors must be removed; hence the
law must prohibit such disclosures except on the
client's consent.7
The Oklahoma supreme court has recognized the historical
basis for the rule and has interpreted the application of the
privilege so as to give this historical basis its full effect.8
This interpretation has resulted in the placing of certain limita-
ions upon the use of the privilege.
In order for the relationship between an attorney and
client to be sufficient to fall within the rule, the court has
limited its application to situations where the relationship
between the attorney and client is one of trust and confidence.
The communication from the client to the attorney must be
made in confidence of such a relationship, and the client must
intend his communication to be treated as confidential. 9 Thus,
the privilege does not exist so as to bar the attorney from
testifying to facts within his personal knowledge, if the facts
were not told to him in reliance on the confidential relation-
ship.10 The court has placed a further limitation on the privi-
4 Black v. Funk, 93 Kan. 60, 143 P. 426 (1914); Brown v. State,
9 Okla. Crim. 382, 132, P. 359 (1913) ; Evans v. State, 5 Okla.
Crim. 643, 115 P. 809 (1911).
5 T. McCoRmcK, LAW OF EvIDENCE §181 (1954).
6 8 J. WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §2290, at 547 (McNaughton Rev.
1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGmORE].
7 WIGMORE §2291, at 550.
s Brown v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. 382, 132 P. 359 (1913).
9 Parnacher v. Mount, 207 Okla. 275, 248 P.2d 1021 (1952);
Tankersley Inv. Co. v. Tankersley Inv. Co., 202 Okla. 51,
210 P.2d 167 (1949) (dissent); Wright v. Quinn, 201 Okla.
565, 207 P.2d 912 (1949); Ratzlaff v. State, 122 Okla. 263,
249 P. 934 (1926).10 Buxbaum v. Priddy, 312 P.2d 961 (Okla. 1957).
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lege by eliminating from the privilege any communications
made in the presence of third persons, unless the circumstan-
ces are such that the communication retains its confidential
character." Statements which are made in the presence of
third persons, without justifying circumstances, have been
deemed unprivileged, and any party to such communications
may testify as to the conversation.12 These Oklahoma restric-
tions on the application of privilege are in the most part simi-
lar to the restrictions which the federal courts apply to the
privilege. 13
The court in Marcus has now expanded the limitations on
the application of the privilege. The court held that, while
the relationship between attorney and client may be such as
to fit within the above guidelines, all such conversations are
not privileged. The court held, when information is communi-
cated to an attorney for the purpose of ultimately disclosing
the information to third persons, the information loses its
privileged character.
The court in reaching this decision further expanded the
limitations handed down in other cases. In Parnacher v. Mount,
11 Parnacher v. Mount, 207 Okla. 275, 248 P.2d 1021 (1952);
Jayne v. Bateman, 191 Okla. 272, 129 P.2d 188 (1942);
l-owsley v. Clark, 167 Okla. 371, 29 P.2d 947 (1934).
12 Joy v. Litchfield, 189 Okla. 122, 113 P.2d 974 (1941).
1 United States v. United States Shoe Machine Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357, 358-9 (D. Mass. 1950) which provides:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder
of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made (a) is
a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and
(b) in this connection with this communication is act-
ing as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a
fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his
client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for
the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion
on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some
legal proceeding and not for the purpose of commit-
ting a crime or tort; (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
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this court held that "To enjoy the protection of the statute they
must be made in confidence of the relation and under such
'circumstances as to imply that they should ever remain secret."
(Emphasis added) .14 Thus in this earlier decision, the court em-
phasized the need for secrecy before any communication would
be entitled to be privileged, but the court did not decide wheth-
er all subsequent disclosures would violate this requirement.
In In re Wilkins, the court held that in certain circumstances
the privilege will be waived by knowledge of possible ultimate
disclosure. 15 In Wilkins, the court held that one who makes a
will does so with knowledge that upon his death it will be pub-
lished, and that testimony may be required to establish that it
expresses his wishes. This decision also failed to eliminate the
privilege in all cases of ultimate disclosure to third persons.
The court in Wilkins was only holding that, when disclosure
will result in the communication becoming public, the privi-
lege will be denied.
The court's decision in Avery v. Nelson 0 is also in con-
flict with the Marcus decision. In Avery, the court held that
the physician-patient privilege is not waived by the patient
answering questions on a discovery deposition, but is only
waived when the patient voluntarily offers himself as a wit-
ness. Here again the court was saying that communications
which are sure of ultimate disclosure to the public are not
privileged, but communications which are intended to be dis-
closed in limited circumstances, such as a discovery deposition,
still retain the privilege.
The court, in reaching its decision in Marcus, expanding
the limitations on the exercise of privilege in the attorney-
client relationship, was following the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Colton v.
United States.1 7 In Colton, that court held that "Not all com-
munications between an attorney and his client was privileged.
14 Parnacher v. Mount, 207 Okla. 263, 248 P.2d 1021 (1952).
15 In re Wilkins Estate, 199 Okla. 249, 185 P.2d 213 (1947).
16 Avery v. Nelson, 455 P.2d 75, 77 (Okla. 1969).
17 Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 9, No. I
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Particularly in the case of an attorney preparing a tax return
... a good deal of information transmitted to the attorney by a
client is not intended to be confidential but rather is "given by
the client for the transmission to others by the attorney, for
example, an inclusion in the tax return. Such information is
of course not privileged."
CONCLUSION
In reaching its decision in Marcus, the court placed new
limits on the extent of the attorney-client privilege in Okla-
homa. The court attempted to limit its decision to the specific
facts of the case. This limitation, however, does not change the
effect of the decision.
As a result of Marcus, any communication which is made
to an attorney for ultimate disclosure to third persons is out-
side the privilege, regardless of whether this disclosure will
lessen the secrecy of the communication or make the com-
munication public knowledge. The court in reaching this de-
cision rejected the contention that 26 U.S.C.A. §7213,18 which
makes it illegal for federal employees to make public informa-
tion disclosed on income tax returns, was applicable to the case
at hand. The court, by rejecting this contention is, in effect,
modifying its holdings in Parnacher, Wilkins, and Avery, that
the privilege will only be lost when disclosure to third persons
will result in making the communication public.
The Marcus decision can only serve to further restrict
the application of the attorney-client privilege and lessen
client confidence in the privilege. As a result of this decision,
both clients and attorneys must be aware that ultimate dis-
closure will void the privilege, and that the attorney may be
required to testify as to the portions of the communications
intended to be disclosed. James L. Sanders
18 INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 7213, which provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the
United States to divulge or to make known, in any
manner whatever, not provided by law, to any person
the amount or source of income, profits, losses, ex-
penditures, or any particular thereof, set forth or dis-
closed in any income return.
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